

Treasury Management Strategy Statement and Annual Investment Strategy for 2014/15

1 Introduction

1.1 Background

1.1.1 Treasury management is defined as:

“The management of the local authority’s investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks”.

1.2 Statutory requirements

1.2.1 The Local Government Act 2003 (the Act) and supporting regulations requires the Council to ‘have regard to’ the CIPFA Prudential Code and the CIPFA Treasury Management Code of Practice to set Prudential and Treasury Indicators for the next three years to ensure that the Council’s capital investment plans are affordable, prudent and sustainable.

1.2.2 The Act requires the Council to set out its treasury strategy for borrowing and to prepare an Annual Investment Strategy (as required by Investment Guidance subsequent to the Act and included at Section 7 of this report); this sets out the Council’s policies for managing its investments and for giving priority to the security and liquidity of those investments.

1.2.3 The Department of Communities and Local Government has issued revised investment guidance which came into effect from 1 April 2010. There were no major changes required over and above the changes already required by the revised CIPFA Treasury Management Code of Practice 2009.

1.3 CIPFA requirements

1.3.1 The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy’s (CIPFA) Code of Practice on Treasury Management (revised November 2009) was adopted by this Council on 18 February 2010. In preparing this strategy due regard has also been given to subsequent revisions to the code.

1.3.2 The primary requirements of the Code are as follows:

- 1 Creation and maintenance of a Treasury Management Policy Statement which sets out the policies and objectives of the Council's treasury management activities.
- 2 Creation and maintenance of Treasury Management Practices which set out the manner in which the Council will seek to achieve those policies and objectives.
- 3 Receipt by the full Council of an annual Treasury Management Strategy Statement - including the Annual Investment Strategy - for the year ahead, a Mid-year Review Report and an Annual Report (stewardship report) covering activities during the previous year.
- 4 Delegation by the Council of responsibilities for implementing and monitoring treasury management policies and practices and for the execution and administration of treasury management decisions.
- 5 Delegation by the Council of the role of scrutiny of treasury management strategy and policies to a specific named body. For this Council the delegated body is the Audit Committee.

1.3.3 The scheme of delegation and role of the Section 151 officer that give effect to these requirements are set out at **[Appendix 1]** and **[Appendix 2]** respectively.

1.4 Treasury Management Strategy for 2014/15

1.4.1 The suggested strategy for 2014/15 in respect of the following aspects of the treasury management function is based upon the treasury officers' views on interest rates, supplemented with market forecasts provided by the Council's treasury advisor, Capita Asset Services (previously known as Sector).

1.4.2 The strategy covers:

- treasury limits in force which will limit the treasury risk and activities of the Council
- the current treasury position
- the borrowing requirement
- Prudential and Treasury Indicators
- prospects for interest rates
- creditworthiness policy
- the investment strategy

- policy on use of external service providers

1.5 Balanced Budget Requirement

1.5.1 It is a statutory requirement under Section 33 of the Local Government Finance Act 1992, for the Council to produce a balanced budget. In particular, Section 32 requires a local authority to calculate its budget requirement for each financial year to include the revenue costs that flow from capital financing decisions. This means that increases in capital expenditure must be limited to a level whereby increases in charges to revenue from:

- increases in interest charges caused by increased borrowing to finance additional capital expenditure, and
- any increases in running costs from new capital projects are limited to a level which is affordable within the projected income of the Council for the foreseeable future.

2 Treasury Limits for 2014/15 to 2016/17

2.1 It is a statutory duty under Section 3 of the Act and supporting regulations, for the Council to determine and keep under review how much it can afford to borrow. The amount so determined is termed the “Affordable Borrowing Limit”. In England and Wales the Authorised Limit represents the legislative limit specified in the Act.

2.2 The Council must have regard to the Prudential Code when setting the Authorised Limit, which essentially requires it to ensure that total capital investment remains within sustainable limits and, in particular, that the impact upon its future council tax levels is ‘acceptable’.

2.3 Whilst termed an “Affordable Borrowing Limit”, the capital plans to be considered for inclusion incorporate financing by both external borrowing and other forms of liability, such as credit arrangements. The Authorised Limit is to be set, on a rolling basis, for the forthcoming financial year and two successive financial years; details of the Authorised Limit can be found in **[Appendix 3]** of this report.

3 Current Portfolio Position

3.1 The Council is debt free and as such the overall treasury position at 31 December 2013 comprised only investments, which totaled £23.4m (excluding Landsbanki) generating an average return of 0.66%.

4 Borrowing Requirement

- 4.1 Other than for cash flow purposes and then within the limits set out at **[Appendix 3]** borrowing will not be necessary. All capital expenditure in 2014/15 will be funded from the Revenue Reserve for Capital Schemes, grants, developer contributions and capital receipts arising from the sale of assts.

5 Prudential and Treasury Indicators for 2014/15 – 2016/17

- 5.1 Prudential and Treasury Indicators as set out in **[Appendix 3]** are relevant for the purposes of setting an integrated treasury management strategy.
- 5.2 The Council is also required to indicate if it has adopted the CIPFA Code of Practice on Treasury Management. The original 2001 Code was adopted on 30 September 2003 and the revised 2009 Code was adopted by the full Council on 18 February 2010. Subsequent Code amendments are also complied with.

6 Prospects for Interest Rates

- 6.1 The Council has appointed Capita Asset Services as treasury advisor to the Council and part of their service is to assist the Council to formulate a view on interest rates. **[Appendix 4]** draws together a number of current City forecasts for short term (Bank Rate) and longer fixed interest rates. Capita's expectation for the Bank Rate for the financial year ends (March) is:
- 2013/ 2014 0.50%
 - 2014/ 2015 0.50%
 - 2015/ 2016 0.50%
 - 2016/ 2017 1.25%
- 6.3 The recession that followed the global financial crisis of 2008 has been the deepest and recovery from it the slowest the UK has experienced in recent history. However, growth in the UK economy has rebounded during 2013 to surpass all expectations. Growth prospects remain strong for 2014, not only in the UK economy as a whole, but in all three main sectors, services, manufacturing and construction. One downside is that wage inflation continues to remain significantly below inflation so disposable income and living standards are under pressure, although income tax cuts have ameliorated this to some extent. A rebalancing of the economy towards exports has started but as 40% of UK exports go to the Eurozone, the difficulties in this region are likely to continue to

dampen UK growth. There are, therefore, concerns that a UK recovery currently based mainly on consumer spending and the housing market, may not endure much beyond 2014. The US, the main world economy, faces similar debt problems to the UK, but thanks to reasonable growth, cuts in government expenditure and tax rises, the annual government deficit has been halved from its peak without appearing to do too much damage to growth.

- 6.4 The current economic outlook and structure of market interest rates and government debt yields have two key treasury management implications:
- Although Eurozone concerns have subsided in 2013, Eurozone sovereign debt difficulties have not gone away and there are concerns over how these will be managed. Government debt to GDP ratios in some countries will continue to rise to levels that may result in a loss of investor confidence in the financial viability of such countries. Counterparty risks therefore remain elevated suggesting the use of higher quality counterparties for shorter time periods; and
 - Investment returns are likely to remain relatively low during 2014/15 and beyond.
- 6.5 A more detailed view of the current economic background, provided by Capita, is contained in **[Appendix 5]**.

7 Annual Investment Strategy

7.1 Investment Policy

- 7.1.1 The Council's investment policy has regard to the CLG's Guidance on Local Government Investments and the CIPFA Treasury Management in Public Services Code of Practice and Cross Sectoral Guidance Notes (adopted 2009 Code and subsequent revisions). As a consequence, the Council's investment priorities are:
- the security of capital and;
 - the liquidity of its investments.
- 7.1.2 The Council also aims to achieve the optimum return on its investments commensurate with proper levels of security and liquidity. The risk appetite of this Council is low in order to give priority to the security of its investments.
- 7.1.3 The borrowing of monies purely to invest or on-lend and make a return is unlawful and this Council will not engage in such activity.

7.1.4 Investment instruments identified for use in the financial year are listed in **[Appendix 6]** under the 'Specified' and 'Non-Specified' Investments categories. Counterparty limits will be as set out at paragraph 7.3.2.

7.2 Creditworthiness Policy

7.2.1 This Council uses the creditworthiness service provided by Capita. This service has been progressively enhanced over the last few years and now uses a sophisticated modelling approach with credit ratings from all three rating agencies - Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's forming the core element. However, it does not rely solely on the current credit ratings of counterparties but also uses the following as overlays:

- credit watches and credit outlooks from credit rating agencies;
- Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads to give early warning of likely changes in credit ratings; and
- sovereign ratings to select counterparties from only the most creditworthy countries.

7.2.2 This modelling approach combines credit ratings, credit watches and credit outlooks in a weighted scoring system which is then combined with an overlay of CDS spreads for which the end product is a series of colour code bands which indicate the relative creditworthiness of counterparties. These colour codes are also used by the Council to **inform** (previously determine) the duration for investments and are therefore referred to as durational bands. The Council is satisfied that this service now gives a much improved level of security for its investments. It is also a service which the Council would not be able to replicate using in-house resources.

7.2.3 The selection of counterparties with a high level of creditworthiness will be achieved by selection of institutions down to a minimum durational band within Capita's weekly credit list of worldwide potential counterparties. Subject to an appropriate sovereign and counterparty rating the Council will therefore use counterparties within the following durational bands:

Yellow	5 years
Purple	2 years
Blue	1 year (nationalised or part nationalised UK Banks)
Orange	1 year
Red	6 months
Green	100 Days (previously 3 months)

- 7.2.4 This Council will not use the approach suggested by CIPFA of using the lowest rating from all three rating agencies to determine creditworthy counterparties as Moody's tend to be more aggressive in giving low ratings than the other two agencies. This approach has the potential to leave the Council with few banks on its approved lending list. The Capita creditworthiness service does though, use ratings from all three agencies, but by using a risk weighted scoring system, does not give undue preponderance to just one agency's ratings.
- 7.2.5 All credit ratings will be reviewed weekly and monitored on a daily basis. The Council is alerted to changes to ratings of all three agencies through its use of the Capita creditworthiness service.
- if a downgrade results in the counterparty / investment scheme no longer meeting the Council's minimum criteria, its further use as a new investment will be withdrawn immediately.
 - in addition to the use of Credit Ratings the Council will be advised of information in movements in Credit Default Swap against the iTraxx benchmark and other market data on a weekly basis. Extreme market movements may result in a downgrade of an institution or removal from the Councils lending list.
- 7.2.6 Sole reliance will not be placed on the use of this external service. In addition this Council will also use market data and market information, information on government support for banks and the credit ratings of that government support.

7.3 Country, Group and Counterparty Limits

- 7.3.1 The Council has determined that it will only use approved counterparties from countries with a minimum sovereign credit rating of AA- as determined by all three rating agencies (Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's). The list of countries that qualify using this credit criteria as at the date of this report are shown in **[Appendix 7]**. This list will be added to, or deducted from; by officers should ratings change in accordance with this policy.
- 7.3.2 Avoidance of a concentration of investments in too few counterparties or countries is a key to effective diversification and in this regard the limits set out below are thought to achieve a prudent balance between risk and practicality and are applicable to both cash flow and core fund investment.

Annex 3

Country, Counterparty and Group exposure	Maximum Proportion of Cash Flow and Core Funds
UK Sovereign (subject to a minimum rating of AA-)	100%
Each non-UK Sovereign rated AA- or better	20%
Group limit excluding UK nationalised / part nationalised banks	20%
Each counterparty rated Fitch A, F1, bbb-, 1 (green using Capita's credit methodology) or better	20%
Each UK nationalised or part nationalised bank / group	25%
Each AAA multilateral / supranational bank	20%
Each AAA rated bond fund / gilt fund / enhanced cash fund / government liquidity fund / equity fund or property fund subject to maximum 20% exposure to all such funds	10%
Each money market fund rated Moody's AAAmf, Fitch AAmmf, Standard & Poor's AAAm	20%
Non-specified investments over 1 year duration	60%

7.3.3 Cash flow balances vary depending on the timing of receipts and payments during the month and from month to month. For cash flow investments the limits identified in paragraph 7.3.2 will be based on an estimate of the expected average daily cash flow balance at the start of the financial year.

7.4 Investment Strategy

Available funds

7.4.1 Funds available for investment are split between cash flow and core funds. Cash flow funds are generated from the collection of council tax, business rates and other income streams. They are consumed during the financial year to meet payments to precepting authorities and government (NNDR contributions) and to meet service delivery costs (benefit payments, staff salaries and suppliers in general). The consumption of cash flow funds during the course of a financial year places a natural limit on the maximum duration of investments (up to one year). Core funds comprise monies set aside in the Council's

revenue and capital reserves and are generally available to invest for durations in excess of one year.

Cash flow investments

- 7.4.2 The average daily cash flow balance throughout 2014/15 is expected to be £9.3m. Of that figure some £4m is likely to be available for longer than three months. The Investment Strategy for 2013/14 required such funds (those available for longer than three months) to be passed to the Council's external fund manager unless a better rate of return could be achieved from managing those funds in-house without undue added risk. In each of the last three years, in-house management has been the preferred option and **for 2014/15 all cash flow fund investments will be managed in-house with no requirement to transfer funds to the external fund manager.**
- 7.4.3 Investments in respect of cash flow will be made with reference to cash flow requirements (liquidity) and the outlook for short-term interest rates (i.e. rates for investments up to 12 months). Liquidity will be maintained by using bank deposit accounts and money markets funds. Were duration can be tolerated, additional yield will be generated by utilising notice accounts, term deposits with banks and building societies and enhanced cash funds.
- 7.4.6 In compiling the Council's estimates for 2014/15 a return on cash flow investments of 0.75% has been assumed. This return is consistent with return being achieved in 2013/14 and reflects a continuation throughout 2014/15 of the current 0.5% Bank Rate.

Core fund investments

- 7.4.7 During 2014/15 the Council's core funds will be part managed on a discretionary basis by the Council's external fund manager (Investec Asset Management Ltd). The fund manager is obliged to comply with the Annual Investment Strategy including the parameters established at paragraphs 7.3.1 and 7.3.2 and the schedule of specified and non-specified investments detailed at **[Appendix 6]**.
- 7.4.8 Historically all core funds have been managed by an external fund manager. However, the core fund balance is diminishing as a proportion is consumed each year (approximately £2.25m per annum) to support the Council's revenue budget and capital expenditure plans. The average core fund balance during 2014/15 is expected to be £11.4m and the Council's Treasury Management Team are of the view that the core fund is now of a size that its investment can be managed in-house. Whilst a specific date for the transfer of responsibility has yet

to be determined the expectation is that **by the end of the 2014 /15 financial year all core fund investments will managed in-house.**

- 7.4.10 Regardless of management responsibility (in-house or external) the Council will avoid locking into longer term deals while investment rates are down at historically low levels unless attractive rates are available with counterparties of particularly high creditworthiness which make longer term deals worthwhile and are within the risk parameters set by this Council.
- 7.4.11 In compiling the Council's estimates for 2014/15 a return on core fund investments of 0.85% has been assumed. This return anticipates a small uplift in yield will be generated over cash flow investment expectations (paragraph 7.4.6). Subject to the credit quality and exposure limits outlined in paragraph 7.3.2, liquidity and yield will be achieved by a mix of investments using predominantly fixed term deposits, certificates of deposit, notice accounts and enhanced cash funds. The existing UK Gilt position is likely to be retained to maturity but not added to (yield at purchase of 1.16%, maturing 2018).

7.5 End of year investment report

- 7.5.1 At the end of the financial year, the Council will report on its investment activity as part of its Annual Treasury Report.

7.6 Policy on the use of external service providers

- 7.6.1 The Council uses Capita as its external treasury management advisors.
- 7.6.2 The Council recognises that responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the organisation at all times and will ensure that undue reliance is not placed upon our external service providers.
- 7.6.3 It also recognises that there is value in employing external providers of treasury management services in order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources. The Council will ensure that the terms of their appointment and the methods by which their value will be assessed are properly agreed and documented, and subjected to regular review.

Appendices

1. Treasury management scheme of delegation
2. Treasury management role of the section 151 officer
3. Prudential and Treasury indicators
4. Interest rate forecasts
5. Economic background
6. Specified and Non-specified Investments
7. Approved countries for investments

Appendix 1 Treasury management scheme of delegation

(i) Full council

- budget approval.
- approval of treasury management policy.
- approval of the annual Treasury Management Strategy Statement and Annual Investment Strategy.
- approval of amendments to the Council's adopted clauses, Treasury Management Policy Statement and the annual Treasury Management Strategy Statement and Annual Investment Strategy.
- approval of the treasury management outturn report.

(ii) Cabinet

- budget consideration.
- approval of Treasury Management Practices.
- approval of the division of responsibilities.
- approval of the selection of external service providers and agreeing terms of appointment.
- acting on recommendations in connection with monitoring reports.

(iii) Audit Committee

- reviewing the annual Treasury Management Strategy Statement and Annual Investment Strategy and making recommendations to Cabinet and Council.
- receive reports on treasury activity at regular intervals during the year and make recommendations to Cabinet.
- reviewing treasury management policy, practices and procedures and making recommendations to Cabinet and Council.

(iv) Finance, Innovation and Property Advisory Board

- receiving budgetary control reports at regular intervals that include treasury management performance.

Appendix 2 Treasury management role of the section 151 officer

The S151 (responsible) officer

- recommending clauses, treasury management policy/practices for approval, reviewing the same regularly, and monitoring compliance.
- submitting regular treasury management policy reports.
- submitting budgets and budget variations.
- receiving and reviewing management information reports.
- reviewing the performance of the treasury management function.
- ensuring the adequacy of treasury management resources and skills, and the effective division of responsibilities within the treasury management function.
- ensuring the adequacy of internal audit, and liaising with external audit.
- recommending the appointment of external service providers.

Appendix 3 Prudential and Treasury Indicators

The prudential indicators relating to capital expenditure cannot be set until the capital programme is finally determined and will as a consequence be reported as part of the Setting the Budget for 2014/15 report that is to be submitted to Cabinet on 4 February 2014.

The treasury management indicators are as set out in the table below:

TREASURY MANAGEMENT INDICATORS	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17
	Actual	Estimate	Estimate	Estimate	Estimate
	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000
Authorised Limit for external debt :					
borrowing	Nil	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000
other long term liabilities	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
TOTAL	Nil	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000
Operational Boundary for external debt:-					
borrowing	Nil	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000
other long term liabilities	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
TOTAL	Nil	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000
Actual external debt	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
Upper limit for fixed interest rate exposure > 1 year at year end	Nil	It is anticipated that net exposure will range between 0% to 60%			
Upper limit for variable rate exposure < 1 year at year end	16,767 (80.5%)	It is anticipated that net exposure will range between 40% to 100%			
Upper limit for total principal sums invested for over 364 days at year end	Nil	60% of core funds			

Maturity structure of fixed rate borrowing during 2014/15	upper limit	lower limit
under 12 months	100 %	0 %
Over 12 months	0 %	0 %

Appendix 4 Interest Rate Forecasts (November 2013)

Capita Asset Services Interest Rate View														
	Dec-13	Mar-14	Jun-14	Sep-14	Dec-14	Mar-15	Jun-15	Sep-15	Dec-15	Mar-16	Jun-16	Sep-16	Dec-16	Mar-17
Bank Rate View	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.75%	1.00%	1.00%	1.25%
3 Month LIBID	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.60%	0.70%	0.90%	1.30%
6 Month LIBID	0.60%	0.60%	0.60%	0.60%	0.60%	0.60%	0.60%	0.60%	0.60%	0.70%	0.80%	1.00%	1.20%	1.40%
12 Month LIBID	0.80%	0.80%	0.80%	0.80%	0.80%	0.80%	0.80%	1.00%	1.20%	1.40%	1.60%	1.80%	2.00%	2.30%
5yr PWLB Rate	2.50%	2.50%	2.60%	2.70%	2.70%	2.80%	2.80%	2.90%	3.00%	3.10%	3.20%	3.30%	3.40%	3.40%
10yr PWLB Rate	3.60%	3.60%	3.70%	3.80%	3.80%	3.90%	3.90%	4.00%	4.10%	4.20%	4.30%	4.30%	4.40%	4.50%
25yr PWLB Rate	4.40%	4.40%	4.50%	4.50%	4.60%	4.60%	4.70%	4.80%	4.90%	5.00%	5.10%	5.10%	5.10%	5.10%
50yr PWLB Rate	4.40%	4.40%	4.50%	4.50%	4.60%	4.70%	4.80%	4.90%	5.00%	5.10%	5.20%	5.20%	5.20%	5.20%
Bank Rate														
Capita Asset Services	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.75%	1.00%	1.00%	1.25%
UBS	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Capital Economics	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	-	-	-	-	-
5yr PWLB Rate														
Capita Asset Services	2.50%	2.50%	2.60%	2.70%	2.70%	2.80%	2.80%	2.90%	3.00%	3.10%	3.20%	3.30%	3.40%	3.40%
UBS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Capital Economics	2.10%	2.30%	2.30%	2.30%	2.30%	2.30%	2.50%	2.90%	3.30%	-	-	-	-	-
10yr PWLB Rate														
Capita Asset Services	3.60%	3.60%	3.70%	3.80%	3.80%	3.90%	3.90%	4.00%	4.10%	4.20%	4.30%	4.30%	4.40%	4.50%
UBS	3.90%	4.00%	4.00%	4.10%	4.10%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Capital Economics	3.30%	3.55%	3.55%	3.55%	3.55%	3.55%	3.55%	3.55%	3.80%	-	-	-	-	-
25yr PWLB Rate														
Capita Asset Services	4.40%	4.40%	4.50%	4.50%	4.60%	4.60%	4.70%	4.80%	4.90%	5.00%	5.10%	5.10%	5.10%	5.10%
UBS	4.40%	4.50%	4.50%	4.60%	4.60%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Capital Economics	4.10%	4.20%	4.20%	4.20%	4.20%	4.20%	4.20%	4.20%	4.30%	-	-	-	-	-
50yr PWLB Rate														
Capita Asset Services	4.40%	4.40%	4.50%	4.50%	4.60%	4.70%	4.80%	4.90%	5.00%	5.10%	5.20%	5.20%	5.20%	5.20%
UBS	4.50%	4.50%	4.60%	4.60%	4.70%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Capital Economics	4.30%	4.40%	4.40%	4.40%	4.40%	4.40%	4.40%	4.40%	4.50%	-	-	-	-	-

Appendix 5 Economic Background Provide by Capita Asset Services**1 THE GLOBAL ECONOMY**

The Eurozone (EZ). The sovereign debt crisis has eased during 2013 which has been a year of comparative calm after the hiatus of the Cyprus bailout in the spring. The EZ finally escaped from seven quarters of recession in quarter 2 of 2013 but growth is likely to remain weak and so will dampen UK growth. The ECB's pledge to buy unlimited amounts of bonds of countries which ask for a bail out, has provided heavily indebted countries with a strong defence against market forces. This has bought them time to make progress with their economies to return to growth or to reduce the degree of recession. However, debt to GDP ratios (2012 figures) of 176% Greece, Italy 131%, Portugal 124%, Ireland 123% and Cyprus 110%, remain a cause of concern, especially as many of these countries are experiencing continuing rates of increase in debt in excess of their rate of economic growth i.e. these debt ratios are continuing to deteriorate. Any sharp downturn in economic growth would make these countries particularly vulnerable to a new bout of sovereign debt crisis. It should also be noted that Italy has the third biggest debt mountain in the world behind Japan and the US. Greece remains particularly vulnerable and continues to struggle to meet EZ targets for fiscal correction. Many commentators still view a Greek exit from the Euro as inevitable and there are concerns that austerity measures in Cyprus could also end up in forcing an exit. The question remains as to how much damage an exit by one country would do and whether contagion would spread to other countries. However, the longer a Greek exit is delayed, the less are likely to be the repercussions beyond Greece on other countries and on EU banks. It looks increasingly likely that Slovenia will be the next country to need a bailout.

Sentiment in financial markets has improved considerably during 2013 as a result of firm Eurozone commitment to support struggling countries and to keep the Eurozone intact. However, the foundations to this current "solution" to the Eurozone debt crisis are still weak and events could easily conspire to put this into reverse. There are particular concerns as to whether democratically elected governments will lose the support of electorates suffering under EZ imposed austerity programmes, especially in countries like Greece and Spain which have unemployment rates of over 26% and unemployment among younger people of over 50%. The Italian political situation is also fraught with difficulties in maintaining a viable coalition which will implement an EZ imposed austerity programme and undertake overdue reforms to government and the economy.

USA. The economy has managed to return to reasonable growth in Q2 2013 of 2.5% y/y and 2.8% in Q3, in spite of the fiscal cliff induced sharp cuts in federal expenditure that kicked in on 1 March, and increases in taxation. The Federal Reserve has continued to provide huge stimulus to the economy through its \$85bn per month asset purchases programme of quantitative

easing. However, it is expected that this level of support will start to be tapered down early in 2014. It has also pledged not to increase the central rate until unemployment falls to 6.5%; this is probably unlikely to happen until early 2015. Consumer, investor and business confidence levels have improved markedly in 2013. The housing market has turned a corner and house sales and increases in house prices have returned to healthy levels. Many house owners have, therefore, been helped to escape from negative equity and banks have also largely repaired their damaged balance sheets so that they can resume healthy levels of lending. All this portends well for a reasonable growth rate looking forward.

China. Concerns that Chinese growth could be heading downwards have been allayed by recent stronger statistics. There are still concerns around an unbalanced economy which is heavily dependent on new investment expenditure, and for a potential bubble in the property sector to burst, as it did in Japan in the 1990s, with its consequent impact on the financial health of the banking sector. There are also increasing concerns around the potential size, and dubious creditworthiness, of some bank lending to local government organisations and major corporates. This primarily occurred during the government promoted expansion of credit, which was aimed at protecting the overall rate of growth in the economy after the Lehmans crisis.

Japan. The initial euphoria generated by “Abenomics”, the huge QE operation instituted by the Japanese government to buy Japanese debt, has tempered as the follow through of measures to reform the financial system and the introduction of other economic reforms, appears to have stalled. However, at long last, Japan has seen a return to reasonable growth and positive inflation during 2013 which augurs well for the hopes that Japan can escape from stagnation and deflation and so help to support world growth. The fiscal challenges though are huge; the gross debt to GDP ratio is about 245% in 2013 while the government is currently running an annual fiscal deficit of around 50% of total government expenditure. Within two years, the central bank will end up purchasing about Y190 trillion (£1,200 billion) of government debt. In addition, the population is ageing due to a low birth rate and will fall from 128m to 100m by 2050.

2 THE UK ECONOMY

Economic growth. Until 2013, the economic recovery in the UK since 2008 had been the worst and slowest recovery in recent history. However, growth strongly rebounded in 2013 - quarter 1 (+0.3%), 2 (+0.7%) and 3 (+0.8%), to surpass all expectations as all three main sectors, services, manufacturing and construction contributed to this strong upturn. The Bank of England has, therefore, upgraded growth forecasts in the August and November quarterly

Inflation Reports for 2013 from 1.2% to 1.6% and for 2014 from 1.7% to 2.8%, (2015 unchanged at 2.3%). The November Report stated that:

“In the United Kingdom, recovery has finally taken hold. The economy is growing robustly as lifting uncertainty and thawing credit conditions start to unlock pent-up demand. But significant headwinds — both at home and abroad — remain, and there is a long way to go before the aftermath of the financial crisis has cleared and economic conditions normalise. That underpins the MPC’s intention to maintain the exceptionally stimulative stance of monetary policy until there has been a substantial reduction in the degree of economic slack. The pace at which that slack is eroded, and the durability of the recovery, will depend on the extent to which productivity picks up alongside demand. Productivity growth has risen in recent quarters, although unemployment has fallen by slightly more than expected on the back of strong output growth”.

So very encouraging - yes, but, still a long way to go! However, growth is expected to be strong for the immediate future. One downside is that wage inflation continues to remain significantly below CPI inflation so disposable income and living standards are under pressure, although income tax cuts have ameliorated this to some extent. A rebalancing of the economy towards exports has started but as 40% of UK exports go to the Eurozone, the difficulties in this area are likely to continue to dampen UK growth.

Forward guidance. The Bank of England issued forward guidance in August which said that the Bank will not start to consider raising interest rates until the jobless rate (Labour Force Survey / ILO i.e. not the claimant count measure) has fallen to 7% or below. This would require the creation of about 750,000 jobs and was forecast to take three years in August, but revised to possibly quarter 4 2014 in November. The UK unemployment rate currently stands at 2.5 million i.e. 7.6 % on the LFS / ILO measure. The Bank's guidance is subject to three provisos, mainly around inflation; breaching any of them would sever the link between interest rates and unemployment levels. This actually makes forecasting Bank Rate much more complex given the lack of available reliable forecasts by economists over a three year plus horizon. The recession since 2007 was notable for how unemployment did NOT rise to the levels that would normally be expected in a major recession and the August Inflation Report noted that productivity had sunk to 2005 levels. There has, therefore, been a significant level of retention of labour, which will mean that a significant amount of GDP growth can be accommodated without a major reduction in unemployment.

Credit conditions. While Bank Rate has remained unchanged at 0.5% and quantitative easing has remained unchanged at £375bn in 2013, the Funding for Lending Scheme (FLS), aimed at encouraging banks to expand lending to small and medium size enterprises, has been extended. The FLS certainly seems to be having a positive effect in terms of encouraging house purchases

(though levels are still far below the pre-crisis level), FLS is also due to be bolstered by the second phase of Help to Buy aimed at supporting the purchase of second hand properties, which is now due to start in earnest in January 2014. While there have been concerns that these schemes are creating a bubble in the housing market, the house price increases outside of London and the south-east have been minimal. However, bank lending to small and medium enterprises continues to remain weak and inhibited by banks still repairing their balance sheets and anticipating tightening of regulatory requirements.

Inflation. Inflation has fallen from a peak of 3.1% in June 2013 to 2.2% in October. It is expected to fall back to reach the 2% target level within the MPC's two year time horizon.

AAA rating. The UK has lost its AAA rating from Fitch and Moody's but that caused little market reaction.

3 **Capita Asset Services forward view**

Economic forecasting remains difficult with so many external influences weighing on the UK. Major volatility in bond yields is likely to endure as investor fears and confidence ebb and flow between favouring more risky assets i.e. equities, and safer bonds.

There could well be volatility in gilt yields over the next year as financial markets await the long expected start of tapering of asset purchases by the Fed. The timing and degree of tapering could have a significant effect on both Treasury and gilt yields. Equally, at the time of writing, the political deadlock and infighting between Democrats and Republicans over the budget, and the raising of the debt limit, has only been kicked down the road, rather than resolved. Resolving these issues could have a significant effect on gilt yields during 2014.

The longer run trend is for gilt yields and PWLB rates to rise, due to the high volume of gilt issuance in the UK, and of bond issuance in other major western countries. Increasing investor confidence in economic recovery is also likely to compound this effect as a continuation of recovery will further encourage investors to switch back from bonds to equities.

The overall balance of risks to economic recovery in the UK is currently evenly weighted. However, only time will tell just how long this period of strong economic growth will last; it also remains exposed to vulnerabilities in a number of key areas.

The interest rate forecasts in this report are based on an initial assumption that there will not be a major resurgence of the EZ debt crisis, or a break-up of the EZ, but rather that there will be a managed resolution of the debt crisis

where EZ institutions and governments do what is necessary. Under this assumed scenario, growth within the EZ will be tepid for the next couple of years and some EZ countries experiencing low or negative growth, will, over that time period, see a significant increase in total government debt to GDP ratios. There is a significant danger that these ratios could rise to the point where markets lose confidence in the financial viability of one, or more, countries. However, it is impossible to forecast whether any individual country will lose such confidence, or when, and so precipitate a resurgence of the EZ debt crisis. While the ECB has adequate resources to manage a debt crisis in a small EZ country, if one, or more, of the large countries were to experience a major crisis of market confidence, this would present a serious challenge to the ECB and to EZ politicians.

Downside risks currently include:

- UK strong economic growth is currently very dependent on consumer spending and recovery in the housing market. This is unlikely to endure much beyond 2014 as consumer borrowing is already high and wage inflation is less than CPI inflation, so disposable income is being eroded.
- A weak rebalancing of UK growth to exporting and business investment causing a major weakening of overall economic growth beyond 2014
- Weak growth or recession in the UK's main trading partners - the EU and US, depressing economic recovery in the UK.
- Prolonged political disagreement over the US Federal Budget and raising of the debt ceiling
- A return to weak economic growth in the US, UK and China causing major disappointment in investor and market expectations.
- A resurgence of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis caused by ongoing deterioration in government debt to GDP ratios to the point where financial markets lose confidence in the financial viability of one or more countries and in the ability of the ECB and Eurozone governments to deal with the potential size of the crisis
- The potential for a significant increase in negative reactions of populaces in Eurozone countries against austerity programmes, especially in countries with very high unemployment rates e.g. Greece and Spain, which face huge challenges in engineering economic growth to correct their budget deficits on a sustainable basis.
- Italy has the third highest level of government debt in the world. Given the political situation difficulties may arise in implementing austerity measures and a programme of reform.
- Problems in other Eurozone heavily indebted countries (e.g. Cyprus and Portugal) which could also generate safe haven flows into UK gilts, especially if it looks likely that one, or more countries, will need to leave the Eurozone.
- Monetary policy action failing to stimulate sustainable growth in western economies, especially the Eurozone and Japan.
- Geopolitical risks e.g. Syria, Iran, North Korea, which could trigger safe haven flows back into bonds

The potential for upside risks to UK gilt yields and PWLB rates, especially for longer term PWLB rates include:

- A sharp upturn in investor confidence that sustainable robust world economic growth is firmly expected, causing a surge in the flow of funds out of bonds into equities.
- A reversal of Sterling's safe-haven status on a sustainable improvement in financial stresses in the Eurozone.
- UK inflation being significantly higher than in the wider EU and US, causing an increase in the inflation premium inherent to gilt yields.
- In the longer term – an earlier than currently expected reversal of QE in the UK; this could initially be implemented by allowing gilts held by the Bank to mature without reinvesting in new purchases, followed later by outright sale of gilts currently held.

Appendix 6 Specified and Non-specified Investments

All specified and non-specified Investments will be:

Subject to the sovereign, group and counterparty exposure limits identified in the Annual Investment Strategy.

Subject to the duration limit recommended by Capita (**+3 months for UK Financial Institutions** or as assessed by the external fund manager) at the time each investment is placed.

Subject to a maximum of 60% of core funds, in aggregate, being held in non-specified investments at any one time.

Sterling denominated.

Specified Investments (maturities up to 1 year):

Investment	Minimum Credit Criteria	Use
UK Debt Management Agency Deposit Facility	UK Sovereign AA-	In-house
Term deposits - UK local authorities	UK Sovereign AA-	In-house
Term deposits - UK nationalised and part nationalised banks	UK Sovereign AA-	In-house and Fund Manager
Term deposits - banks and building societies	UK / Non-UK Sovereign AA-. Counterparty A, F1, bbb-, 1 or Green excl. CDS if in-house	In-house and Fund Manager
Certificates of deposit - UK nationalised and part nationalised banks excluding Ulster Bank (part of RBS)	UK Sovereign AA-	In-house and Fund Manager
Certificates of deposit - banks and building societies	UK / Non-UK Sovereign AA-. Counterparty A, F1, bbb-, 1 or Green excl. CDS if in-house	In-house and Fund Manager
UK Treasury Bills	UK Sovereign AA-	In-house and Fund Manager
UK Government Gilts	UK Sovereign AA-	In-house and Fund Manager
Bonds issued by multi-lateral development banks	AAA	In-house and Fund Manager
Sovereign bond issues (other than the UK govt)	AAA	In-house and Fund Manager

Collective Investment Schemes structured as Open Ended Investment Companies (OEICs):		
1. Money Market Funds	Moody's AAAMf, Fitch AAAMmf, Standard and Poor's AAAM	In-house and Fund Manager
2. Government Liquidity Funds	AAA	In-house and Fund Manager
3. Enhanced Cash Funds	AAA	In-house and Fund Manager
4. Bond Funds excluding corporate bonds	AAA	In-house and Fund Manager
5. Gilt Funds	AAA	In-house and Fund Manager
6. Equity Funds	AAA	In-house and Fund Manager
7. Property Funds	AAA	In-house and Fund Manager

Non-specified Investments (maturities in excess of 1 year and any maturity if not included above):

Investment	Minimum Credit Criteria	Use	Max duration to maturity
Fixed term deposits with variable rate and variable maturities (structured deposits) - UK nationalised and part nationalised banks	UK Sovereign AA-	In-house	2 years
Fixed term deposits with variable rate and variable maturities (structured deposits) - banks and building societies	UK / Non-UK Sovereign AA-. Counterparty A, F1, bbb-, 1 (Green)	In-house	2 years
Term deposits - local authorities	UK Sovereign AA-	In-house	2 years
Term deposits - UK nationalised and part nationalised banks excluding Ulster Bank (part of RBS)	UK Sovereign AA-	In-house	2 years

Annex 3

Term deposits - banks and building societies	UK / Non-UK Sovereign AA-. Counterparty A, F1, bbb-, 1 (Green)	In-house	2 years
Certificates of deposit - UK nationalised and part nationalised banks excluding Ulster Bank (part of RBS)	UK Sovereign AA-	In-house and Fund Mgr	2 years
Certificates of deposit - banks and building societies	UK / Non-UK Sovereign AA-. Counterparty A, F1, bbb-, 1 (Green)	In-house and Fund Mgr	2 years
Commercial paper - UK nationalised and part nationalised banks excluding Ulster Bank (part of RBS)	UK Sovereign AA-	In-house and Fund Mgr	2 years
Commercial paper - banks and building societies	UK / Non-UK Sovereign AA-. Counterparty A, F1, bbb-, 1 (Green)	In-house and Fund Mgr	2 years
Floating rate notes issued by multilateral development banks	AAA	In-house and Fund Mgr	5 years
Bonds issued by multilateral development banks	AAA	In-house and Fund Mgr	5 years
Sovereign bond issues (other than the UK Government)	AAA	In-house and Fund Mgr	5 years
UK Government Gilts	UK Sovereign AA-	In-house and Fund Mgr	Max of 25% 5 years
UK Government Gilts	UK Sovereign AA-	In-house and Fund Mgr	Max of 25% 10 years

Accounting treatment of investments

The accounting treatment may differ from the underlying cash transactions arising from investment decisions made by this Council. To ensure that the Council is protected from any adverse revenue impact, which may arise from these differences, we will review the accounting implications of new transactions before they are undertaken.

Appendix 7 Approved countries for investments

All counterparties in addition to meeting the minimum credit criteria specified in the Annual Investment Strategy must be regulated by a sovereign rated as a minimum AA- by each of the three rating agencies (Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's).

This list will be reviewed and amended if appropriate on a weekly basis by the Director of Finance and Transformation.

As of 31 December 2013 sovereigns meeting the above requirement were:

AAA	Australia Canada Denmark Finland Germany Luxembourg Norway Singapore Sweden Switzerland
AA+	France Netherlands Hong Kong UK USA
AA	Abu Dhabi (UAE) France Qatar
AA-	Belgium Saudi Arabia